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TAKEN TO THE CLEANERS: 
PANAMA’S FINANCIAL SECRECY LAWS 
FACILITATE THE LAUNDERING OF 
EVADED U.S. TAXES 
t is estimated that as much as $1.5 trillion may be “laundered” every 
year worldwide, or about two to five percent of the global domestic 
product.1 Of this amount, $500 billion can be attributed to hiding the 
proceeds of tax evasion.2 Tax evasion and money laundering, although 
separate and distinct crimes, are intertwined in that all illegal proceeds, 
when laundered, effectively evade taxes, and all legitimate money that 
evades taxes becomes illegal and subsequently needs to be “laundered.”3 
Money laundering can have substantial negative economic conse-
quences for a country on an international scale.4 Money laundering can 
disrupt a country’s financial integrity or even alter its economic policy.5 
                                                                                                             
 1. Linda McGlasson, Revisions to Bank Secrecy Act: Anti-Money Laundering Exam 
Manual a “Positive Step,” Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.552. 
See also Internal Revenue Service, Overview: Money Laundering, http://www.irs.gov/ 
compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=112999,00.html [hereinafter IRS Overview: Money 
Laundering] (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) (defining “money laundering” as “the means by 
which criminals evade paying taxes on illegal income by concealing the source and the 
amount of profit”) 
 2. Lucy Komisar, Closing Down the Tax Haven Racket, June 8, 2007, http://the 
komisarscoop.com/2007/06/closing-down-the-tax-haven-racket. 
 3. Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to 
Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911,  
931 n.90 (2007). See also U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONTROL OF MONEY LAUNDERING 2 (1995) (“Hiding legitimately 
acquired money to avoid taxation also qualifies as money laundering.”). 
 4. John McDowell & Gary Novis, The Consequences of Money Laundering and Fin-
ancial Crime, ECON. PERSPS. (May 2001). 
 5. Id. (“Money laundering can also adversely affect currencies and interest rates, as 
launderers reinvest funds where their schemes are less likely to be detected, rather than 
where rates of return are higher. And money laundering can increase the threat of mone-
tary instability due to the misallocation of resources from artificial distortions in asset and 
commodity prices. . . . There are [also] significant social costs and risks associated with 
money laundering. Money laundering is a process vital to making crime worthwhile. It 
allows drug traffickers, smugglers, and other criminals to expand their operations. This 
drives up the cost of government due to the need for increased law enforcement and 
health care expenditures (for example, for treatment of drug addicts) to combat the se-
rious consequences that result. . . . [Financial] criminal activity has been associated with a 
number of bank failures around the globe . . . .”). See also Julia Layton, How Money 
Laundering Works, http://money.howstuffworks.com/money-laundering3.htm (last visited 
Dec. 12, 2008) (“Other major issues facing the world’s economies include errors in eco-
nomic policy resulting from artificially inflated financial sectors. Massive influxes of 
dirty cash into particular areas of the economy that are desirable to money launderers 
I 
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It corrupts government and banking officials, creates volatile internation-
al exchange rates, and produces unpredictable capital movements.6 Fur-
thermore, money laundering helps fund terrorism and terrorist organiza-
tions, and undermines the national security of a country.7 But the effects 
of money laundering can also be felt on a local level. Loss of tax revenue 
is arguably one of the more significant socio-economic effects of money 
laundering.8 A government’s inability to raise money through the collec-
tion of taxes may restrict investments in social services.9 Basic social 
programs such as health, housing, and education may not be properly 
funded, or may even be discontinued, because the tax revenue required to 
subsidize such programs has evaded government collection through the 
money laundering process.10 All citizens feel the effects of tax evasion 
and money laundering, in that the loss of tax revenue forces the 
government to place the burden on honest taxpayers to cover such costs 
through higher tax rates.11 
One of the most common and increasingly used methods to evade tax-
es and to launder money is to place assets in a “tax haven country.”12 In 
general, a “tax haven” is simply a country that imposes few or no taxes.13 
However, some tax havens provide financial mechanisms, such as 
confidential bank accounts and shell companies, the only purposes of 
which are to hide the identities of the true owners from tax authorities 
and law enforcement of other countries.14 These countries also tend to 
have strict financial secrecy laws that severely limit, if not prevent, the 
                                                                                                             
create false demand, and officials act on this new demand by adjusting economic poli-
cy.”). 
 6. Sam Vaknin, Money Laundering in a Changed World, May 21, 2005, http://www. 
globalpolitician.com/2746-money-laundering. 
 7. International Monetary Fund, Factsheet: The IMF and the Fight Against Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, Apr. 2007, http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/exr/facts/aml.htm [hereinafter IMF Factsheet]. See also Juan Zarate, Assistant Sec’y 
for Terrorist Fin. & Fin. Crimes, Prepared Remarks to the Florida Bankers Ass’n. (Feb. 9, 
2005) [hereinafter Zarate Remarks to the Florida Bankers Ass’n] (on file with the Trea-
sury Dep’t. Office of Public Affairs). 
 8. See McDowell & Novis, supra note 4. See also Layton, supra note 5. 
 9. Annan Boodram, The Many Faces of Money Laundering, http://www.caribvoice. 
org/Business/moneylaund.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2008). 
 10. Komisar, supra note 2. 
 11. McDowell & Novis, supra note 4. 
 12. David Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006. 
See also Komisar, supra note 2. 
 13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 695 (2d Pocket ed. 2001). 
 14. Komisar, supra note 2. 
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exchange of tax-related information between governments,15 obstructing 
a government’s ability to find and prosecute tax cheats. The U.N. Office 
on Drugs and Crime states that such “financial havens and bank secrecy 
are a ‘tool kit’ for money launderers.”16 Furthermore, in the United 
States, $40 to $70 billion of tax revenue are believed to be hidden from 
the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) each year through the use of the tax 
haven system.17 
In February 2007, as part of the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, 
Panama was listed as a “probable location for U.S. tax evasion.”18 In ad-
dition, the U.S. State Department currently considers Panama a “major 
money laundering country”19 for its allowance of financial transactions 
involving significant amounts of proceeds from serious crimes.20 Both 
tax evaders and money launderers are drawn to Panama because it has, 
arguably, the strictest financial secrecy laws in the world and has even 
been nicknamed the “New Switzerland.”21 This may be why Panama is 
second in the world, behind Hong Kong, in the number of foreign com-
panies incorporated in its jurisdiction, companies believed to be used for 
the purpose of circumventing their local taxes.22 Moreover, the 2007 Na-
tional Money Laundering Strategy23 has identified Panama as the back-
drop for a wide range of money laundering schemes.24 
                                                                                                             
 15. David Spencer, Exchange of Tax Information, in 5 ACCOUNTANCY BUSINESS AND 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 89 (2006). 
 16. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime [UNODC], Report on Financial Havens, Bank 
Secrecy and Money-Laundering, U.N. Doc. UNIS/NAR/641 (June 8, 1998) [hereinafter 
UNODC, Report]. 
 17. Mike Godfrey, Senate “Offshore” Hearing Called “One-Sided,” Aug. 3, 2006, 
http://www.tax-news.com/archive/story/Senate_Offshore_Hearing_Called_OneSided_xx 
xx24430.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
 18. Senate Newsroom Release, Summary of Levin-Coleman-Obama Stop Tax Haven 
Abuse Act (Feb. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Tax Haven Abuse Act Summary] 
 19. DEP’T OF ST. BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, 1 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 5–6 (2007) [hereinafter INCSR 
vol. 1] 
 20. DEP’T OF ST. BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, 2 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 53 (2007) [hereinafter INCSR 
vol. 2] 
 21. See OffshoreLegal.org, Panama Asset Protection vs. Swiss Asset Protection, 
http://www.offshorelegal.org/asset-protection/panama-offshore-asset-protection/swiss-as 
set-protection-vs-panama-asset-protection.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2008) (“Switzerland 
was once the offshore asset protection capital of the world.”). 
 22. Peter Riggs, Why Are We Negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with Tax Haven 
Panama?, June 30, 2007, http://www.taxjustice-usa.org/index.php?option=com_content 
&task=view&id=119&Itemid=47. 
 23. See Fin. Inst. Letter from Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Bank Secrecy Act, 2007 Na-
tional Money Laundering Strategy (May 23, 2007) (noting that the 2007 National Money 
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This is not to say that Panama necessarily condones or supports money 
laundering. In fact, the country has very strict anti-money laundering 
regulations.25 The problem, however, is that Panama only recognizes the 
crime of money laundering when it is directly related to a specified illeg-
al activity such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, or extortion.26 Because 
the Panamanian Government does not rely on income taxes as an essen-
tial part of the tax revenue it collects, the evasion of income tax is not 
considered a crime.27 Therefore, tax evasion cannot be used as a predi-
cate offense in prosecuting a money laundering violation in Panama.28 
Furthermore, Panama’s legal structure follows the “dual criminality” 
principle, meaning that an offense must be a recognized crime in both 
Panama and the requesting country for Panama to comply with any fi-
nancial information requests.29 Consequently, petitions by the United 
States for financial information in purely tax-related matters will general-
ly not be honored.30 
The dual criminality principle provides a safeguard against abuses by 
foreign jurisdictions attempting to discount the privacy rights afforded by 
Panama’s borders.31 A basic principle of international law is that one 
country generally does not enforce the tax laws of another.32 Thus, the 
                                                                                                             
Laundering Strategy was an interagency report released in May 2007 that incorporates 
information accumulated from the 2005 U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment, 
which identified various risks to the U.S. financial sector posed by money laundering). 
 24. See NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 27, 43, 51, 58 (2007). [hereinafter 
NMLS 2007] 
 25. See Sec. Comm’n Res. No. 1-2004, Feb. 9, 2004. (Pan.); Law No. 42 (2000) 
(Pan.); Law No. 41 (2000) (Pan.); Law No. 147 (1966) (Pan.). 
 26. Law No. 41, art. 389 (defining the crime of money laundering as the receipt, ne-
gotiation, conversion, or transfer of moneys, titles, securities, assets, and other financial 
resources with knowledge that they are the product of activities related to drug traffick-
ing, qualified embezzlement, traffic of human beings, traffic of illegal weapons, kidnap-
ping, extortion, embezzlement, corruption of civil servants, robbery, international vehicle 
contraband, and acts of terrorism). 
 27. Ronojit Banerjee, Money Laundering in the EU, http://www.people.ex.ac.uk/ 
watupman/undergrad/ron/tax20evasion.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2008). See Taxation: 
Income Tax, 2008 PANAMA L. DIG. §§ 21.01, 21.09 (describing incomes not subject to 
taxation under the Panama Fiscal Code of 1956). 
 28. Banjeree, supra note 27. 
 29. INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORKING TOGETHER: IMPROVING REGULATORY 
COOPERATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE (2007). 
 30. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Ah, Panama, 47 TAX NOTES INT’L 11 
(2007), available at http://www. panamaallinone.com/doc/Economic_Analysis_Panama.pdf. 
 31. Panamalaw.org, Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA), http://www. 
panamalaw.org/tax_information_exchange_agreements.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2008). 
 32. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 352 (2005); Banco Nacional de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964). See also Banerjee, supra note 27. 
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United States must work within the parameters of a county’s legal sys-
tem to ensure that U.S. taxes are not evaded. 
However, the obstacles to the U.S. prosecution of criminals, namely fi-
nancial secrecy and dual criminality, could be circumvented very easily 
with a tax treaty between the United States and Panama. More specifical-
ly, a Tax Information Exchange Agreement (“TIEA”)33 would allow for 
the free exchange of financial tax information irrespective of differences 
in either country’s requirement or definition of a predicate crime to mon-
ey laundering. 
Tax treaties are valuable mechanisms enabling U.S. federal law en-
forcement agencies to track down tax evaders as well as other crimi-
nals.34 The advantage of tax information is that, even if the United States 
is unable to prosecute criminals for major money producing crimes, it 
can still prosecute them for the accompanying offense of tax evasion. For 
example, when the U.S. government could not convict Al Capone on any 
of his suspected crimes, the IRS was able to convict him of tax evasion.35 
Bruno Richard Hauptmann, the man famed for kidnapping the Lindbergh 
baby, was initially arrested because of his failure to “launder the ransom 
money successfully.”36 
On an international level, tax treaties have led to the effective prosecu-
tion of those who have attempted to hide their assets from U.S. tax au-
thorities. For example, an American taxpayer was recently convicted for 
tax evasion after he tried to hide his assets in off-shore tax havens such 
as Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and Panama.37 The fact that the 
IRS and the Department of Justice gathered enough evidence to prose-
cute this case through their TIEA with Bermuda38 demonstrates the im-
                                                                                                             
 33. Panamalaw.org, supra note 31 (“This is an agreement whereby one country can 
request all financial investment information regarding [its] citizens and corporations. This 
most definitely includes bank account information and stock brokerage type investments. 
There is no probable cause requirement to get this information. There is no criminality or 
dual criminality required. There is not even a tax violation required. The terms used in 
these treaties run along the lines of the country requesting the information claiming that 
[it] believe[s] the information to be relevant to [its] tax investigation.”). 
 34. Press Release, John Harrington, Acting Int’l Tax Counsel, Testimony Before the 
Senate Finance Committee on Offshore Tax Evasion (May 3, 2007) [hereinafter Harring-
ton] (on file with Treasury Dep’t). 
 35. F.B.I History, Famous Cases: Alphonse Capone, aka Al, Scarface, http://www. 
fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/capone/capone.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2008). See also 
IRS Overview: Money Laundering, supra note 1. 
 36. Paul Bauer & Rhoda Ullmann, Understanding the Wash Cycle, ECON. PERSPS. 2 
(2001). 
 37. Harrington, supra note 34. 
 38. Id. (“[I]n 2004, Almon Glenn Braswell was sentenced to eighteen months in pris-
on and ordered to pay over $10 million in back taxes, interest and penalties. Mr. Bras-
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portance of such a tax treaty. Had the taxpayer hidden all of his money in 
Panama alone, the outcome would have been very different. 
The key to prosecuting money laundering is simply to “follow the 
money trail.”39 The ability to recover tax and financial information is the 
most effective way to secure the evidence required to reach a conviction 
for money laundering.40 IRS investigations of illegal income are critical 
elements in assuring a money laundering conviction,41 and the agency 
values that “[t]he long hours of tracking and documenting financial leads 
allow an investigation to go right to the door of the money launderers 
and eventually to the leader of the illegal enterprise.”42 The laundering of 
money accomplishes two important purposes for the criminal. First, it 
covers the trail of evidence leading back to the crime that produced the 
illicit funds.43 Secondly, it conceals the money itself from forfeiture.44 
For these reasons, obtaining tax information and implementing a tax trea-
ty are of paramount importance. The United States has to be able to trace 
funds back to their original crime as well as recover lost tax revenue. 
This Note argues that a TIEA with Panama would allow the United 
States to circumvent the strict financial secrecy laws that shield Ameri-
can tax evaders and money launderers from prosecution. Part I of this 
Note describes the mechanics and interrelation of money laundering, tax 
evasion, and Panamanian financial secrecy laws. Part II addresses the 
measures the United States has implemented to combat the money laun-
dering problem and their ineffectiveness in dealing with tax evasion. Part 
III proposes how the United States could implement a TIEA with Pana-
ma to address the U.S. need for tax information, while at the same time, 
respecting Panama’s commitment to protecting its financial secrecy re-
gime. 
I. MONEY LAUNDERING AND TAX EVASION IN PANAMA 
First, it must be understood that money laundering and tax evasion are 
separate and distinct offenses. In fact, the two processes actually have 
opposite effects on money. Money laundering is an attempt to hide the 
origin of illicit proceeds in order to make them appear legitimate, basi-
                                                                                                             
well’s use of a Bermuda corporation and bank account as part of his tax evasion scheme 
was uncovered through requests made under our TIEA with Bermuda.”). 
 39. Australian Instit. of Crim., Anti-Money Laundering Symposium (2002), http://www. 
aic.gov.au/conferences/2002- ml/index.html. 
 40. Id.; IRS Overview: Money Laundering, supra note 1. 
 41. IRS Overview: Money Laundering, supra note 1. 
 42. Id. 
 43. UNODC, Report, supra note 16. 
 44. Id. 
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cally turning “dirty” money into “clean” money,45 whereas tax evasion 
involves hiding the profits from initially legal transactions, turning 
“clean” money “dirty.”46 Yet there is a distinct similarity between the 
methods used for money laundering and the commission of tax of-
fenses.47 Both require dishonesty and concealment, and when money 
from illegal activity is shielded from tax officials, there is a direct over-
lap between the two.48 Once money evades taxes, it needs to be laun-
dered before it can be used again.49 In the IRS’s view, “[m]oney launder-
ing is in effect tax evasion in progress.”50 As a result, almost all laun-
dered money has evaded taxes and is therefore unlawful, irrespective of 
its legal or illegal origin.51 
The money laundering process has three separate phases: placement, 
layering, and integration, also known as “wash, dry and fold.”52 The first 
stage, placement, occurs when illicit funds are introduced into banking 
and financial systems, the primary goal of which is to remove the illicit 
funds from direct association with the precedent criminal activity.53 Oth-
                                                                                                             
 45. For a statutory definition of “money laundering,” see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) 
(West 2008). 
 46. Dean, supra note 3. 
 47. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Money Laundering 
and Tax Crimes, http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343,en_2649_33751_2499879_1_ 
1_1_1,00.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2008). 
 48. Donato Masciandaro & Julian Alworth, Tax Evasion, Tax Competition, Lax Fi-
nancial Regulation and Money Laundering: Is There An Overlap? (Univ. of Bocconi 
Soc. Sci. Research Network, Sept. 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=444540#PaperDownload. 
 49. For example, if a person receives $1000 for work and is liable to pay a forty per-
cent marginal rate of income tax on it and fails to declare the income, then $400 is consi-
dered as being stolen from the Treasury. Therefore, he does not launder the $1000, he 
launders the $400, i.e., the tax-evaded money is laundered. The complication that makes 
this difficult to understand is that in order to retain the $400, he puts the whole amount of 
$1000 through the laundering process. He has to show that he received $1000 legitimate-
ly in order to evade a payment of $400. Banerjee, supra note 27 (for purposes of this 
Note, £ has been substituted by USD). 
 50. IRS Overview: Money Laundering, supra note 1. 
 51. Vaknin, supra note 6. 
 52. Karen Dearne, Cracking Down on Cash Cleaners, June 26, 2007, http://www. 
australianit.news.com.au/story/0,24897,21952515-24169,00.html. For an example of the 
three-stage process in the Panamanian context, see Layton, supra note 5 (recounting the 
story of Harvard-educated economist Franklin Jurado, who went to prison in 1996 for 
cleaning $36 million for Colombian drug lord Jose Santacruz-Londono). 
 53. UNODC, Money Laundering—Process, http://www.unodc.un.or.th/money_laun 
dering/ [hereinafter UNODC, Laundering Process] (last visited Jan. 22, 2009). See also 
NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at intro., v. (describing various known money laundering 
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erwise, criminals would not be able to use the money because it would 
connect them to the initial crime.54 The second stage, layering, is more 
complex and attempts to further remove the connection between the 
funds and the original illegal activity.55 It usually involves multiple 
transactions among various financial institutions, accounts, and jurisdic-
tions.56 The purpose is to leave a trail that is almost impossible to trace 
back to its origin, and if successful, the criminal evades pursuit.57 The 
final stage is integration. At this point in the process, the originally illicit 
funds are reintroduced or assimilated into the economy as seemingly le-
gitimate funds or investments.58 
The banking system remains an attractive location for money launder-
ers, because the system is susceptible to manipulation.59 Furthermore, 
because of the confidential financial instruments and strict bank secrecy 
regimes present in most offshore tax havens, including Panama, banks in 
those jurisdictions are involved in most money laundering schemes.60 
Moreover, as Panama functions under a U.S. dollar economy, U.S. tax 
evaders and money launderers are drawn to the jurisdiction because capi-
tal can easily flow into the country without currency-exchange controls 
or restrictions.61 Once illegal money is successfully placed, or deposited, 
                                                                                                             
methods such as trade-based money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, and the Black 
Market Peso exchange). 
 54. Layton, supra note 5. 
 55. UNODC, Laundering Process, supra note 53. 
 56. See Komisar, supra note 2 (“Often someone will use a shell company in one 
jurisdiction that owns a shell in another jurisdiction that owns a bank account in a third. 
That [is] called layering. No one can follow the paper trial.”); Layton, supra note 5 
(“Layering may consist of several bank-to-bank transfers, wire transfers between differ-
ent accounts in different names in different countries, making deposits and withdrawals 
to continually vary the amount of money in the accounts, changing the money’s currency, 
and purchasing high-value items . . . to change the form of the money. This is the most 
complex step in any laundering scheme, and it [is] all about making the original dirty 
money as hard to trace as possible.”). See also UNODC, Laundering Process, supra note 
53 (stating that the layering stage “is the most international in nature”). 
 57. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, ANNUAL REPORT 80 (2005), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/annual_report_2005/ keyactivities.pdf. 
 58. UNODC, Laundering Process, supra note 53. 
 59. NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at v. (stating that this was a key finding of the U.S. 
Money Laundering Assessment). 
 60. UNODC, Report, supra note 16. See also IRS, A Look Behind IRS Anti-Money 
Laundering Programs, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=124069, 
00.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2008) (“Each year billions of untaxed dollars are laundered 
through banks . . . in an effort to make the money appear legitimate or to evade taxes.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 61. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 10; INCSR vol. 2, 
supra note 20, at 317. 
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in an offshore haven bank account, it is easily “layered” through various 
financial transactions and other tax haven jurisdictions.62 The combina-
tion of anonymity and secrecy provides a “tool kit” for money launderers63 
and gives transactions in those jurisdictions a “cloak of confidentiali-
ty.”64 Once dirty money has been effectively “cleaned” offshore, banks 
provide the primary gateway for the money to re-enter the United 
States.65 
Panama remains one of the best jurisdictions for financial anonymity.66 
The U.S. State Department has listed Panama as a “country of primary 
concern” for money laundering because of the confidentiality and infor-
mation protection it provides.67 Anonymity can be accomplished by sev-
eral means with varying degrees of secrecy and complexity, from the 
simple use of a Panamanian debit or credit card account,68 to the opera-
                                                                                                             
 62. NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at 27. See also John L. Evans, International Money 
Laundering: Enforcement Challenges and Opportunities, 3 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1 
(1996) (“Once the proceeds of crime are successfully deposited in the financial system 
many laundering operators take the precaution of moving money, not just offshore, but 
through more than one tax haven and through a maze of shell companies and respectable 
nominees.”). 
 63. UNODC, Report, supra note 16. 
 64. Spencer, supra note 15, at 89. 
 65. NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at v. (stating this was a key finding of the U.S Money 
Laundering Assessment). See also Vaknin, supra note 6 (“It is important to realize that 
money laundering takes place within the banking system. Big amounts of cash are spread 
among numerous accounts, (sometimes in free economic zones, financial off shore cen-
ters, and tax havens), converted to bearer financial instruments (money orders, bonds), or 
placed with trusts and charities. The money is then transferred to other locations, some-
times as bogus payments for ‘goods and services’ against fake or inflated invoices issued 
by holding companies owned by lawyers or accountants on behalf of unnamed beneficia-
ries. The transferred funds are re-assembled in their destination and often ‘shipped’ back 
to the point of origin under a new identity. The laundered funds are then invested in the 
legitimate economy. It is a simple procedure—yet an effective one. It results in either no 
paper trail—or too much of it. The accounts are invariably liquidated and all traces 
erased.”) 
 66. Complete Offshore Privacy and Anonymity in Panama, http://www.offshorelegal. 
org/asset-protection/panama-offshore-asset-protection/complete-offshore-privacy-and-anon 
ymity-in-panama.html [hereinafter Complete Offshore Privacy] (last visited Feb. 3, 
2009). 
 67. For a complete index of “vulnerability factors” used to list countries, see INCSR 
vol. 2, supra note 20, at 41. 
 68. See Robert L. Sommers, Tax Amnesty for Offshore Accounts: The Program and 
Results, May 2003, http://www.taxprophet.com/hot_topic/May03.shtml (“Typically, tax-
payers deposit funds in foreign ‘tax-haven’ banks and then access their funds with debit 
or credit cards issued by the banks. The taxpayer’s identity is protected under secrecy 
laws in the tax haven jurisdiction, so the IRS cannot compel the offshore banks to divulge 
this information.”). See also Complete Offshore Privacy, supra note 66 (describing how a 
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tion of bearer shares and shell corporations in conjunction with nominee 
directors.69 Both individuals and corporations may use these financial 
tools,70 and the more complex the financial arrangements are, the more 
secret (hidden) the information becomes.71 The origin of any illicit mon-
ey, becomes even more difficult to identify once the money is placed in a 
Panamanian bank account and “layered” through subsequent bank trans-
fers and commingled with legitimate money.72 The laundered funds are 
then generally reintroduced to the U.S. market through bank wire trans-
fers using “correspondent” and “payable through” accounts, which can 
further protect against detection.73 
                                                                                                             
taxpayer can purchase anonymous prepaid cards that cannot be traced because they are 
purchased with cash). 
 69. Int’l Ctr. for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Old Laundering Methods 
Hold Fast, Mar. 2007, at 3, http://pvtr.org/pdf/Financial-Response/BulkCash-Trade(ICP 
VTR).pdf. See also NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at 63 (describing “Bearer Shares” as a 
financial device that permits ownership to be attributed to the person in possession of the 
shares, rather than the true beneficial owner of the corporation and provides for a “high 
level of anonymity”) (emphasis added); IRS, Abusive Offshore Tax Avoidance 
Schemes—Glossary of Offshore Terms, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,, 
id=106572,00.html [hereinafter IRS Glossary of Offshore Terms] (A “beneficial owner” 
is defined as “the true owner of an entity, asset, or transaction as opposed to any stated 
ownership provided in documents or oral representations. The beneficial owner is the one 
that receives or has the right to receive proceeds or other advantages as a result of the 
ownership.”); NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at 63 (“Shell Corporations generally have no 
employees or physical assets and are nothing more than a mailing address.”). See also 
Elizabeth MacDonald, Shell Games: With No Federal Oversight, the States are Helping 
to Shelter Crooks, Money Launderers and, Possibly, Terrorists, FORBES.COM, Feb. 12, 
2007, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0212/096.html (noting that generally, shell 
corporations are being increasingly associated with criminal activity); IRS Glossary of 
Offshore Terms, supra (Furthermore, to preserve the anonymity of true beneficial owners 
of such corporations, “nominee directors” are employed to “provide a veil of secrecy as 
to the beneficial owner’s involvement.”). 
 70. Focus Publications, S.A., Focus Panama, http://www.focuspublicationsint.com/ 
focuspanama/en/company-law.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2008). 
 71. IRS Glossary of Offshore Terms, supra note 69. 
 72. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 9. 
 73. USA PATRIOT Act, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. § 312 (2001) [hereinafter USA 
PATRIOT Act] (defining a “correspondent account” as “any account established for a 
foreign financial institution to receive deposits from, or to make payments or other dis-
bursements on behalf of, the foreign financial institution [in the United States]”). See also 
id.; NMLS 2007, supra note 24, at 21–22, app. A; (An example of a “payable through” 
account is one where a foreign bank maintains a checking account at a U.S. bank.  
“The foreign bank could then issue checks to its customers, allowing them to write 
checks on the U.S. account. A foreign bank may have several hundred customers writing 
checks on one ‘payable through account’ . . . .”); Buchanan, Ingersoll & Rooney P.C., 
Potential Tax Implications of the Enhanced Money Laundering Provision of H.R. 3162, 
2001, http://www.buchananingersoll.com/news.php?NewsID=1251 (“The term ‘payable-
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Yet, Panama’s most important asset protection mechanism remains its 
financial privacy laws; more specifically, its bank secrecy laws.74 Al-
though the financial instruments for hiding identities, origins of money, 
and bank transactions can be effective in evading the scrutiny of tax or 
law enforcement officials, they do not alone grant absolute anonymity or 
secrecy.75 Regardless of subsequent attempts to layer, or hide, the origin 
of funds, in order to make use of Panama’s banking system, one must 
initially provide his or her identification to the bank he or she wishes to 
use.76 Generally, U.S. tax officials have the expertise to trace illicit mon-
ey to its source, even if the “trail” is complicated and purposely con-
fused.77 However, what Panama’s secrecy laws provide is, in effect, a 
barrier to U.S. tax officials following the financial trail back into Pana-
ma.78 
Under Panamanian Decree-Law No.9 of February 26, 1998, Panama 
established the “Superintendency of Banks” in order to “oversee the pre-
servation of the soundness and efficiency of the banking system” and 
“[t]o punish violations.”79 The Superintendent of Banks can inquire, re-
trieve, and record any financial information he or she deems important in 
upholding the integrity of the Panamanian banking system.80 Further-
                                                                                                             
through’ account is defined as an account through which a foreign financial institution 
permits its customers to engage, either directly or through a sub-account, in usual bank-
ing business activities. A ‘correspondent’ account is defined as an account established to 
receive deposits from, make payments on behalf of, or permit financial transactions to be 
executed with respect to a foreign financial institution.”). 
 74. Mark Nestmann, Where Your Financial Secrets Remain Secret, Apr. 6, 2007, 
http://www.sovereignsociety.com/ offshore2081.html. See also OffshoreLegal.org, Panama 
Offshore Legal Services, http://www.offshorelegal.org/panama-bank-secrecy-laws.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009); Panamalaw.org, Panama Bank Secrecy Laws, http://www. 
panamalaw.org/panama_bank_secrecy.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 75. Ronald Edwards, Panama Anonymous Bearer Share Corporations, Nov. 13, 2006, 
http://www.goinglegal.com/article9864986.html (“A bank anywhere in the civilized 
world will require a beneficial owner for any bank account and will also require identity 
documents for that person so the bearer share corporation may not be able to conduct 
banking matters completely anonymously.”). 
 76. See ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 146, 147 
(Wouter H. Muller, Christian H. Kälin & John G. Goldsworth eds., 2007) (describing 
Panama Agreement No. 9-2000 of the Superintendency of Banks of October 23, 2000 
[Prevention of Unlawful Use of Banking Services]). 
 77. IRS Overview: Money Laundering, supra note 1. 
 78. See MacDonald, supra note 69. (“[W]ithout such [private corporate ownership 
and bank account] information the police come to a dead end.”). 
 79. See Law No. 9 (1998) (Pan.), art. 5 (Functions of the Superintendency of Banks); 
id. art. 84 (Information Regarding Bank’s Clients) (Superintendencia de Bancos trans.). 
 80. Id. 
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more, all banks are obligated to maintain due diligence81 and care in 
dealing with clients or potential clients,82 and must release any informa-
tion requested by the superintendent to that office.83 However, the secre-
cy laws currently in place act as “blocking statutes” and create a legal 
regime against the disclosure of that financial information to any authori-
ties outside the country.84 
The term “bank secrecy” does not address the privacy of a bank’s own 
activities, but rather those of the bank’s patrons.85 A duty of discretion 
regarding disclosure of patrons’ information binds all bank employees, 
representatives of the bank, and government officials who are in any way 
involved with banking.86 Panama’s bank secrecy laws are predominantly 
regulated by Articles 84, 85, and 86 of the Banking Act of 1998.87 Ar-
ticle 84 of the statute prohibits the Superintendency of Banks to reveal to 
a third party, such as a U.S. tax official, any information obtained from 
bank records, acquired through any inquiry or investigation.88 The re-
quirement for confidentiality extends to any staff members, external au-
ditors, or experts who may be employed or utilized by the superinten-
dent’s office.89 Article 85 forbids Panamanian banks from disclosing 
                                                                                                             
 81. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 203 (defining “due diligence” as 
“such a measure of prudence, activity or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and 
ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man”). 
 82. Law No. 42 (2000) (Pan.) (The law provides in pertinent part, “The persons, natu-
ral or juridical, here mentioned, are under the following obligation: to adequately identify 
their clients. To that effect they shall require from their customers all due references or 
recommendations, as well as the corresponding certifications that attest the incorporation 
and effectiveness of societies, and also the identification of officials, directors, proxies 
and legal representatives of those societies, in a manner that enables them to adequately 
document and determine the real owner or direct or indirect beneficiary.”). 
 83. Id. art. 2. 
 84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442 
rpts. n.4 (1987) (“Blocking statutes are designed to take advantage of the foreign gov-
ernment compulsion defense, § 441, by prohibiting the disclosure, copying, inspection, or 
removal of documents located in the territory of the enacting state in compliance with 
orders of foreign authorities. Some statutes cover all documents, some only certain cate-
gories. . . . All blocking statutes appear to carry some penal sanction.”). 
 85. Rolf H. Weber, Swiss Banking Secrecy in Evolution, 18 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 
317, 318 (2003). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Shirley & Associates, Panama Bank Secrecy, http://www.shirleylaw.com/en/re 
sources/bank-secrecy.htm (last visited Jan 3, 2009). 
 88. Law No. 9 (1998) (Pan.), art. 84 (Information Regarding Bank’s Clients, reaf-
firmed in Pan. G.R. S.B. No. 02-2002 (Norms That Impose Restrictions on the Use of 
Available Information)). 
 89. Id. art. 84. 
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their client’s identity or transactions, absent the client’s consent,90 while 
Article 86 proscribes penalties of up to $100,000, in addition to any other 
“civil or criminal sanctions that may apply” for violating the provisions 
of the statute.91 Additional penalties can include imprisonment of up to 
six months for certain violations.92 
In addition, the attorney-client privilege supplies a final layer of securi-
ty.93 By law, the use of a licensed Panamanian attorney is required to 
establish a corporation, and the attorney is bound to maintain his or her 
client’s confidentiality.94 The attorney-client privilege bars the release of 
all information relating to the client’s personal affairs, as well as any fi-
nancial dealings or transactions.95 Therefore, because it is a lawyer who 
initiates a corporation, and in many circumstances, sets up its bank ac-
count and provides the required nominee directors, a tax evader using 
such an arrangement is practically shielded from all tax scrutiny.96 
As if these formidable obstacles to a foreign government’s intrusion 
were not sufficient, recently, Panama sought to further fortify its privacy 
protection by proposing amendments to Articles 187 and 188-A of its 
Criminal Code.97 The amendments include imprisonment for simply pub-
lishing information regarding a third party without that party’s express 
permission, or for even inquiring into a third party’s personal affairs 
without official state authorization.98 Although these laws were initially 
implemented to protect the privacy of public officials from the media, 
                                                                                                             
 90. Id. art. 85 (Confidentiality of Banks). 
 91. Id. art. 86 (Penalties). 
 92. Foundations and Trusts, 2008 PANAMA L. DIG. § 2.06 (stating that under Panama 
Law No. 25 of June 12, 1995, art. 35, violations of the secrecy and confidentiality provi-
sions of this law “shall be punished with imprisonment for six months and [a] fine of U.S. 
$50,000”). 
 93. Sullivan, supra note 30. 
 94. Corporations: Incorporation, 2008 PANAMA L. DIG. § 2.03 [hereinafter LAW 
DIGEST, Corporations] (Under Panama Decree 147 of May, 1966, art. 1, a Panamanian 
corporation’s registered agent must be an attorney admitted to practice in Panama, and 
such agents are under a duty to know their clients and maintain proper information about 
their clients. However, such information is only disclosed upon petition filed by the Pub-
lic Prosecutor or member of a judicial organ, relating to narcotics trafficking or “of mon-
ey laundering arising therefrom.”). 
 95. Ronald Edwards, Why Use a Law Firm?, Nov. 17, 2006, http://www.goinglegal. 
com/article_97775_86.html. 
 96. Sullivan, supra note 30. 
 97. Press Release, Article 19, Panama: Proposed Criminal Code Severely Restricts 
Freedom of Expression and Information (Feb. 22, 2007) (“Article 19 is an independent 
human rights organization that works globally to protect and promote the right to free-
dom of expression.”). 
 98. Id. 
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anyone wishing to protect his or her privacy can hide behind this legisla-
tion.99 
Nevertheless, the constraints on disclosure are not unrestricted. There 
remain limited situations where privileged information can and is turned 
over to Panamanian authorities.100 Panama’s main bank secrecy laws 
have provisions that allow for the disclosure of information to third par-
ties if requested “within the course of criminal proceedings,”101 and this 
exception extends to the attorney-client privilege as well.102 However, 
information the Superintendency of Banks receives or records is not au-
thorized to be disclosed to U.S. authorities, unless that information can 
be proven to be specifically related to laundering proceeds from the drug 
trade or other serious crimes.103 Tax-related misconduct is only a civil 
matter in Panama, and therefore does not rise to the level of an exception 
to the restriction on disclosure of information to third parties.104 For an 
American tax evader whose only illegal act is to have hidden his or her 
profits from U.S. tax officials, this legal system provides maximum pro-
tection with little cause for fear of prosecution. 
In addition, the Panamanian tax code allows for certain foreign inves-
tors to be exempt from paying any income taxes at all.105 These exempt 
foreign investors tend to be those who implement the types of financial 
mechanisms mentioned earlier in order to execute the types of transac-
tions required for tax exemption status.106 Therefore, because these tax-
payers are not required to pay taxes to Panama, they cannot be guilty of 
any Panamanian tax offense, irrespective of whether such violations are 
treated as civil or criminal matters. There can be no crime of money 
laundering if the funds allegedly laundered are legal on all levels in Pa-
nama. 
The dual criminality principle107 is a significant restriction to U.S. tax 
officials seeking to prosecute tax cheats for money laundering or tax eva-
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. 
 100. Law No. 9 (1998) (Pan.), arts. 84–85. 
 101. Id. 
 102. LAW DIGEST, Corporations, supra note 94. 
 103. Law No. 41 (2000) (Pan.), art. 389 (Capital Laundering). 
 104. Panamalaw.org, supra note 31. See also Banerjee, supra note 27. 
 105. Fiscal Code (1956) (Pan.) (Taxation). 
 106. Offshorelegal.com, Tax Implications of Banking in Panama, http://www.offshorelegal. 
org/offshore-banking/panama-offshore-banking/tax-implications-of-banking-in-panama.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2009). See also AssetProtectionCorp.com, Panamanian Trusts, http://www. 
assetprotectioncorp.com/panamatrusts.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 107. For a discussion on dual criminality, see supra Intro. 
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sion.108 Because Panama adheres to the dual criminality principle, with-
out a tax treaty in place to compel the government to release requested 
financial information, tax officials must pursue the information via the 
long and cumbersome process compelling disclosure through the judicial 
process.109 A U.S. agency must either secure a federal court order, or a 
“letter rogatory,”110 to compel a foreign jurisdiction to provide requested 
information. Although foreign courts generally honor such inquiries,111 
because a request of judicial assistance is based on the principle of “com-
ity”112 between countries, Panama is not obligated to comply with such 
requests.113 In fact, compliance with a letter rogatory for information in 
purely financial matters is a rare event in Panama.114 Even putting the 
issue of comity aside, the slow process of compelling information from a 
foreign government can hinder a U.S. agency’s investigation of sus-
pected tax evasion.115 While the process drags on, tax evaders can con-
tinue to layer and hide their money, making it very difficult for authori-
ties to detect the funds once, or if, a request is honored.116 The U.S. State 
Department has acknowledged the deficiency; because “letters rogatory 
are a time consuming cumbersome process,” it recommends that they 
only be used as a last resort, when “there are no other options availa-
                                                                                                             
 108. For an example of how a lack of dual criminality would require a country to ac-
quiesce to demands for information from another country, see Daily E-Mail Alert No. 
1,425, Aug. 4, 2006, TECH L.J., http://www.techlaw journal.com/alert/2006/08/04.asp. 
 109. Dep’t of St., Bureau of Consumer Affairs, Preparation of Letters Rogatory, 
http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_683.html [hereinafter DOSBCA, Letters 
Rogatory] (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 110. Id. (“A letter rogatory is a formal request from a court in one country to ‘the ap-
propriate judicial authorities’ in another country requesting compulsion of testimony or 
documentary or other evidence. . . . In some countries which do not permit the taking of 
depositions of willing witnesses, letters rogatory are the only method of obtaining evi-
dence.”). 
 111. Edward Ord, The Internal Revenue Service Abroad, in SUMMARY OF THE CANNES 
MEETING: MAY 26–27, 1988 (Milton Grundy prep., 1988). 
 112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 101 
cmt. e (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895)) (“Comity, in the legal 
sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy 
and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard 
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other 
persons who are under the protection of its laws.”). 
 113. JODY R. WESTBY, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO COMBATING CYBERCRIME 45 (2003). 
 114. Sullivan, supra note 30. 
 115. UNODC, Report, supra note 16. See also Edmund L. Andrews, I.R.S. Curtails 
Many Audits in Tax Havens, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007. 
 116. UNDOC, Report, supra note 16. 
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ble.”117 Without a current TIEA, this burdensome process is the method 
that must be used to investigate tax evasion. This being the case, IRS 
officials are abandoning audits of off-shore accounts, and in some cases, 
not even starting an investigation.118 
It is clear that “significant restrictions on access to bank information 
for tax purposes remain in . . . Panama.”119 The Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) states that a “[l]ack of 
transparency and a failure to co-operate internationally create conditions 
[in Panama] that can be exploited by dishonest taxpayers to evade their 
tax obligations.”120 Unless tax officials can “tease the information they 
need out of bank records,” their law enforcement efforts “come to a dead 
end.”121 To demonstrate the importance of being able to follow the mon-
ey trail back to Panama, both Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden 
used money laundering schemes that implemented Panamanian shell 
corporations and bank accounts to help fund their respective Iraqi and al-
Qaeda military operations.122 
II. U.S. MEASURES TO COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND THEIR 
INEFFECTIVENESS IN DEALING WITH TAX EVASION 
In 1970, the U.S. Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), 
acknowledging that U.S. banks were being used to hide money from 
criminal activity and tax evasion.123 The Bank Secrecy Act does not 
shield or hide financial information. Rather, its regulations create a fi-
nancial transparency in the banking industry that allows law enforcement 
and other agencies to track the laundering of evaded taxes and other 
criminal activities.124 Although the BSA itself does not criminalize mon-
                                                                                                             
 117. DOSBCA, Letters Rogatory, supra note 110. 
 118. Andrews, supra note 115. 
 119. OECD, OECD Reports Progress in Fighting Offshore Tax Evasion, But Says 
More Efforts Are Needed, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.oecd.org/document/48/0,3343,en_ 
2649_201185_39482288_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 120. Id. 
 121. MacDonald, supra note 69. 
 122. Lucy Komisar, Saddam’s Secret Money-Laundering Trail, June 2, 2004, http://the 
komisarscoop.com/2004/06/02/saddams-secret-money-laundering-trail/. 
 123. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Secrecy Act and Anti-Money Laun-
dering: Combating Money Laundering, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/bsa/ 
bsa_2.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). For a statutory definition of tax evasion, see 26 
I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7206 (2000). 
 124. James H. Freis, Jr., Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Dir., Remarks to the 
PAN-Am. Congress on Asset Laundering and Fin. Terrorism Prevention and Control 
(July 27, 2007) [hereinafter Freis, Jr., FinCEN Dir. Remarks]. See Cynthia A. Glassman, 
SEC Comm’r, Opening Remarks Before the Symposium on Enhancing Fin. Transparency 
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ey laundering, it requires financial institutions to maintain records for 
certain transactions, effectively creating a “paper trail” that is used to 
prosecute such cases.125 Money laundering was not criminalized in the 
United States until the 1986 enactment of the Money Laundering Control 
Act,126 which recognizes tax evasion as a predicate offense.127 Yet, the 
BSA remains the essential anti-money laundering regulatory system for 
U.S. law enforcement agencies128 and is administered by the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), the Financial Intelligence 
Division of the U.S. Treasury Department.129 
FinCEN has also acknowledged that financial crimes extend beyond 
U.S. borders and broadened its intelligence network to include interna-
tional anti-money laundering support.130 FinCEN now assists other coun-
tries in improving their efforts to combat financial crimes,131 with the 
agency’s Office of International Programs being its second largest de-
partment behind the domestic component.132 International law enforce-
ment agencies rely on information obtained though the BSA’s reporting 
requirements to detect global money laundering schemes.133 FinCEN 
freely shares this information with the goal of using international efforts 
to ultimately protect the U.S. financial system from such financial 
crimes.134 
After the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon in 2001, Congress passed the “Uniting and Strengthening 
                                                                                                             
(June 4, 2002) (defining “financial transparency” as “timely, meaningful and reliable 
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 125. Bauer & Ullmann, supra note 36. See also Cook & Company, Bank Secrecy Act 
of 1970 (BSA), http://www.cookco.us/financial/bank_secrets_act.htm (last visited Jan. 
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 127. Id. 
 128. Freis, Jr., FinCEN Dir. Remarks, supra note 125. 
 129. INCSR vol. 2, supra note 20, at 15. 
 130. Press Release, James E. Johnson, Treas. Assistant Sec’y, Office of Pub. Affairs, 
House Banking & Fin. Serv. Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight & Investigations (Apr. 1, 
1998) [hereinafter Johnson Treas. Assistant Sec’y Press Release]. 
 131. INCSR vol. 2, supra note 20, at 15. 
 132. Norman J. Rabkin, Dir., Admin. of Justice Issues, Statements Before the Sub-
comm. on Gen. Oversight & Investigations, Comm. on Banking & Fin. Services, House 
of Representatives (Apr. 1, 1998). 
 133. IRS, Bank Secrecy Act, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=152532, 
00.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 134. Freis, Jr. FinCEN Dir. Remarks, supra note 125. 
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America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Ob-
struct Terrorism Act of 2001,” the Patriot Act.135 Title III of the Act spe-
cifically addresses money laundering136 and presents amendments to the 
Bank Secrecy Act.137 The amendments generally increase the level of 
specificity required of financial institutions in the gathering and reporting 
of their information.138 The most recent amendment is FinCEN’s final 
rule for § 312 of the Patriot Act, which went into effect September 10, 
2007, and increases the level of due diligence required by U.S. banks 
when transacting with certain foreign accounts.139 
However, what both the BSA’s and the Patriot Act’s requirements for 
self-regulation have done is essentially transform civilian bank em-
ployees into law enforcement agents with the responsibility of monitor-
ing and maintaining specific financial information.140 Complications can 
arise when individuals in the private sector do not have the same level of 
interest in meticulously maintaining the due diligence that the statutes 
require or that law enforcement intended.141 The effectiveness of the sta-
tutes in producing an essential “money trail” for the prosecution of tax 
evasion and other financial crimes can be undermined by those in the 
industry whose primary interest is financial performance, not prosecu-
torial assistance.142 Although the BSA is considered an integral part of 
protecting the American financial system from the movement of illicit 
funds, and a majority of the private sector have complied with its requi-
sites in good faith, clear failures to conform, and even straightforward 
decisions not to comply, with the statute demonstrate the pitfalls of pri-
                                                                                                             
 135. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 73. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See 31 C.F.R. § 103 (providing updated regulations relating to money and finance). 
 138. U.S. Commodities Futures Trad. Comm., Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing, http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/antimoneylaundering/index.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 3, 2009). 
 139. FDIC, Fin. Inst. Letter, USA Patriot Act, Final Regulation Implementing Section 
312—Special Due Diligence Programs for Certain Foreign Accounts (Dec. 21, 2007). See 
31 U.S.C.A. 5318(i)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (West 2008) (describing three specific types of foreign 
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 140. Vaknin, supra note 6. 
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bery, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 95 (Christian Brütsch & 
Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007). 
 142. Id. 
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vate self-regulation.143 Two current examples are Bank of America being 
fined $3 million in January 2007 for “fail[ure] to comply with anti-
money laundering rules relating to ‘high risk’ accounts,”144 and Ameri-
can Express agreeing to pay $65 million for similar BSA violations.145 
These lapses fundamentally defeat the purpose of any anti-money 
laundering legislation and demonstrate a weakness in the system. How-
ever, “the continued safeguarding of the [U.S.] banking system” from the 
threat of money laundering remains the U.S. government’s primary 
goal.146 The 2007 National Money Laundering Strategy identifies areas 
vulnerable to money laundering for the purpose of adjusting and streng-
thening current federal laws in the area.147 Yet, even with full and proper 
compliance with current or improved statutory regulations on the part of 
all participants in the banking industry, the requirements for the collec-
tion of information do not extend into Panama. FinCEN’s increased in-
ternational effort to combat money laundering and the heightened report-
ing conditions put in place after September 11th do not overcome the 
BSA’s limitations in appropriating information from Panamanian finan-
cial institutions or officials. As discussed above, although Panamanian 
officials collect financial information as per their anti-money laundering 
regulations, this information cannot be exchanged with U.S. officials 
unless the United States can demonstrate that such information is directly 
related to a criminal investigation.148 Notwithstanding the U.S. govern-
ment’s increased ability under the Patriot Act to requisition documents 
from foreign banks,149 Panama’s dual criminality requirement effectively 
                                                                                                             
 143. Zarate Remarks to the Florida Bankers Ass’n, supra note 7. For further commen-
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negates any legislatively expanded authority and allows evaded taxes to 
be shielded from U.S. agency inquiries. 
Internationally, the United States combats money laundering through 
the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), a thirty-three member organ-
ization established in 1989 by the G-7 Summit in Paris, whose primary 
focus is on promoting anti-money laundering policies.150 The United 
States, through FinCEN, was an essential part in the FATF’s develop-
ment and aided the agency in its initial policy considerations.151 Al-
though Panama is not one of the FATF’s thirty-three members, it is a 
member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (“CFATF”).152 
The CFATF was established in 1992 and is one of many “FATF-style 
regional bodies, which, in conjunction with the FATF, constitute an affi-
liated global network to combat money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism.”153 These task forces were implemented as a way to get around 
the burdensome process of using letters rogatory to compel foreign juris-
dictions to provide information.154 
To facilitate the exchange of information, two of the FATF’s most sig-
nificant recommendations were that countries criminalize money laun-
dering beyond drug-related offenses and that banks report suspicious 
transactions to domestic authorities.155 Although Panama has complied 
with both proposals, it has not extended its list of predicate offenses to 
include tax-evasion156 or made any specific references to tax matters in 
its Suspicious Activity Reporting Agreement.157 Therefore, Panama’s 
dual criminality constraint hinders the FATF’s power to obtain informa-
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tion through the CFATF relating purely to tax evasion. In addition, Pa-
nama’s secrecy laws prohibit the Unidad de Analisis Financiero, the 
country’s financial intelligence unit, from disclosing such tax-related 
information to its foreign counterparts.158 This lack of transparency is 
why Panama is perpetually labeled by the U.S. Department of State a 
“jurisdiction of primary concern” as a “major money laundering coun-
try.”159 
Furthermore, the exclusion of tax-related violations as a predicate of-
fense for money laundering in Panama’s legal system even impedes U.S. 
agencies’ ability to acquire finical documents directly through the U.S. 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”)160 with Panama.161 This is 
because “the MLAT is used primarily to fight narcotics trafficking, re-
lated money laundering, and other serious crimes. ‘Pure tax’ matters are 
not covered.”162 Therefore, the ability to request information through the 
MLAT, relating to a money laundering probe, may not necessarily be 
used in a tax investigation scenario.163 Panama’s classification of tax 
evasion as only a civil violation seriously impedes the United States’ 
ability to find and prosecute American tax evaders. 
The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act,164 introduced to the Senate in Febru-
ary 2007, has attempted to narrow the scope of legislation to target tax 
evasion specifically through alleged tax haven countries. If adopted, the 
bill would put in place presumptions of tax evasion for certain transac-
tions completed through specified off-shore jurisdictions, such as Pana-
ma.165 The summary of the bill explains that the need for such presump-
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tions stems from the tax and secrecy laws of these jurisdictions, which 
effectively prevent U.S. authorities from accessing the necessary infor-
mation.166 Section 205 clarifies that U.S. investigators may access Suspi-
cious Activity Reports gathered in tax haven territories for civil tax  
matters, and not strictly for criminal proceedings.167 Yet, the most signif-
icant provision of the proposed Act attempts to circumvent the dual-
criminality provision by expanding the Treasury Secretary’s authority 
under § 311 of the Bank Secrecy Act, allowing him to impose financial 
penalties on jurisdictions and financial institutions determined to be “im-
peding U.S. tax enforcement.”168 The Treasury Secretary would also 
have the power to limit such institutions’ abilities to operate and conduct 
business within the United States.169 The bill essentially requires that a 
jurisdiction have a tax treaty, or similar agreement, in place to provide 
for timely and mandatory exchanges of tax information.170 However, the 
bill is not yet law, and while there is some congressional support for its 
underlying challenges to the fundamental structure of tax haven jurisdic-
tions,171 there are those who believe the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act has 
little chance of becoming legislation.172 In fact, even those who support 
the bill recognize that congressional backing is weak.173 Therefore, until 
Congress decides the fate of the bill, the United States remains in its 
current position of relative ineffectiveness in appropriating information 
from Panama relating to the evasion of U.S. taxes and possible under-
lying illegal activity. 
III. A PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT A TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
AGREEMENT 
Every country has the right to implement and enforce both tax and 
legal systems that best suit its needs and promote competition for 
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investment.174 Countries often create tax regimes that will assure a 
certain amount of revenue for the government, while rarely accounting 
for the laws of other jurisdictions or the potentially harmful impact they 
may have on surrounding regions.175 As the current situation illustrates, 
conflicts can emerge when a country must access information that may 
be protected by a foreign legal system, in order to enforce its own 
laws.176 A government’s inability to investigate potential tax violations 
that transcend its borders facilitates the evasion of domestic taxes by en-
couraging taxpayers to transfer assets to foreign jurisdictions.177 There is 
a traditional rule that one nation will not assist another nation in enforc-
ing its tax collection procedures.178 This causes a tension between the 
sovereign power of one nation to “enforce its laws and protect its bor-
ders,” and the sovereign power of another jurisdiction to enforce its 
secrecy laws and keep private any information within its territorial boun-
daries.179 Yet, these types of conflicts have generally been resolved 
through the execution of collaborative tax treaties.180 
This Note argues that the best approach for the United States to recon-
cile its need for tax information with Panama’s right to its tax and bank 
secrecy systems is to negotiate a TIEA with Panama. The government of 
Panama has demonstrated in recent years that it is not unconditionally 
opposed to the exchange of tax information.181 Although Panama has not 
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signed any such treaty with another country,182 and has refused to ap-
proach the issue with the United States,183 a treaty better tailored to ac-
commodate Panamanian concerns may be able to overcome this hurdle. 
In April 2002, Panama sent a commitment letter to the OECD, agree-
ing to respect the Organization’s principles of “effective exchange of tax 
information.”184 The government expressly agreed to exchange bank and 
financial information with other countries investigating tax matters that 
may only rise to the level of civil offenses in Panama, and would normal-
ly be barred from disclosure.185 However, in December of that year,  
Panama’s government expressed concern to the OECD about the organi-
zation’s lack of “non-discriminatory treatment.”186 The government be-
lieved that the OECD was not committed to creating a “level playing 
field” and favored certain European OECD members by exempting them 
from the same exchange obligations as were imposed on Panama.187 
Concerned by the OECD’s double standard and inaction to ameliorate 
the disparity, Panama withdrew from its earlier commitment.188 The 
OECD’s policy was viewed as a threat to Panama’s sovereignty189 by 
trying to impose restrictions, unfairly and inequitably, on its ability to 
compete in the financial services market.190 
Nevertheless, by negotiating a TIEA solely with Panama, where in-
formation exchange commitments would be equal between both coun-
tries, the United States could resolve the “level playing field” issue. A 
narrow jurisdictional scope with equally binding terms would indicate a 
dedication to fairness and a respect for Panama’s sovereignty. Panama 
has a legitimate concern that it may lose its competitive edge in the re-
gion if it relaxes it secrecy laws.191 Due to the fact that other notorious 
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“tax havens” such as the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands have signed 
TIEAs,192 the value to Panama in maintaining its secrecy laws and not 
entering into a similar agreement increases.193 Yet, through diligent ne-
gotiations, both countries could circumvent this concern by narrowly 
tailoring the conditions that would trigger the requirement to exchange 
information, and restricting the categories of data that would have to be 
transferred. 
Conceivably, both countries would be able to define specific circums-
tances that would elicit the exchange of information, but that do not in-
fringe on Panama’s general assurance of secrecy. For example, by limit-
ing a situation to defined asset amounts transferred through specific types 
of financial instruments or transactions that originate from U.S. banks, 
U.S. investigators could gain access to information customized to tax 
evasion, while Panama could retain its overall international commitment 
to secrecy. Although such a limited scope may exclude many instances 
of tax evasion and money laundering from scrutiny, it would at least be a 
step in the right direction. Collaboration on a small scale would allow 
authorities in both nations to familiarize themselves with an increased 
volume of information exchanges, without getting overwhelmed by a 
flood of requests that may accompany a broader treaty. As the process 
becomes more customary, it may be easier to slowly expand the treaty’s 
reach. 
In addition, a narrow scope would mean that only very specific trans-
actions, those purposely instigated to evade U.S. taxes, would be deterred 
from going through Panama. Therefore, the country could retain its lu-
crative bank secrecy regime with little financial loss from legitimate 
business. Additionally, the Unites States could offset any minimal loss to 
Panama by implementing an asset sharing program. The countries could 
share not only the revenue from recovered taxes, but also any punitive 
damages U.S. authorities impose for tax violations.194 Regardless of the 
specific provisions of a U.S.-Panamanian TIEA, a treaty would require a 
careful balancing of both countries’ right to administer their respective 
laws. This will only be possible through diligent diplomacy and the wil-
lingness of each government to accommodate and respect the other’s 
necessities. 
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CONCLUSION 
The loss of tax revenue to the U.S. Treasury is a significant side effect 
of money laundering with a substantial impact on the U.S. economy. 
Evaded taxes are typically funneled through tax haven countries because 
of the anonymity and strict secrecy laws those jurisdictions provide. The 
lack of economic transparency in these offshore havens permits the ori-
gin of illicit funds to remain hidden from U.S. investigators, and aides 
the money’s re-entry into the U.S. banking system as seemingly legal 
money. Although tax evasion and money laundering are inherently simi-
lar, they are separate and distinct violations. While both can be criminal 
matters in the United States, the evasion of taxes is not a criminal issue 
in Panama unless the tax evasion directly implicates a more serious 
crime usually relating to drugs. Only in those situations do Panama’s 
secrecy laws authorize disclosure of tax and financial information. 
Therefore, requests for information in purely U.S. tax evasion investiga-
tions will generally not be honored. This creates a safe haven for tax 
cheats to hide their money and subsequently launder it back to the United 
States. 
The U.S. government has made a cogent effort to strengthen its domes-
tic laws regarding money laundering and financial crimes. However, 
reinforced domestic legislation can neither overcome the principle of 
dual criminality, nor compel Panama to breach its own secrecy regime. 
Furthermore, international financial task forces, put in place to combat 
money laundering, have also not been able to reach purely economic 
matters such as tax evasion. Consequently, evaded taxes remain pro-
tected in Panama. 
Nevertheless, the signing of a TIEA could circumvent the barriers es-
tablished by secrecy laws. Although Panama does not currently have 
such an agreement in place, it may be possible through diplomatic chan-
nels to tailor an agreement that would accommodate both the United 
States’ need for access to financial information and Panama’s insistence 
that its secrecy laws not be compromised. However, until such a TIEA is 
effectuated, Panama’s bank secrecy laws will continue to facilitate the 
laundering of evaded U.S. taxes. 
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